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BOOK REVIEW
LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS.
By ARTHUR SmNn y BMDsnEy.C The Foundation Press, Inc.,
1937.
In the welter of praise and criticism which clusters about the
framework of the common law there is always discernible a sort
of reverent admiration for the quality of suppleness which has
enabled its spirit to survive the sclerosis of the logically impacted
intellect. Exact definitions and the establishment of absolutes serve
well in various scientific fields for the purposes of discussion,
although at the best they are but estimates of probable action; but
law encircles rather than explains every-day conduct, hence the
"principles" of law are constantly undergoing laboratory tests of
verity, that is, of their workability.
Only recently was it said of the common law: "Under the ortho-
dox theory of the common law its principles were supposed to be
universal, eternal and immutable".' The use of the past tense
suggests that the orthodox theory is or has gone out of the window.
But if ever there has been such a theory it is traceable to the
influence of such great writers on the common law as Blackstone,
Kent and Story; and, more importantly, to the predilection of
American judges for generalizations as a substitute for exacting
factual analysis. Oddly enough, the American reports even of
the earliest date do not exhibit such cautious reasoning as is
found in the English books, considering that the English reports
down to the beginning of the nineteenth century are the sources of
our common law.
It is no criticism of Kent and Story, or of any expounder of the
common law, to reject as unreal any suggestion of the immutability
of principle or to accept, with reservations only, the implications
of rational exactitude incident to formal classifications. Blackstone
must, at least, bear some of the blame for this form of indoctrina-
tion of "immutableness"; for Blackstone presented the profession
with that systematic logical analysis of the common law which
became classical in the American books. Yet Blackstone did not
depart much from Bracton in method and it may be suspected that
the civil law writers had much influence on the style of both of
these men. Such successive influences, however, do not account
for the differences in judicial attitude between English and Ameri-
can judges, for the former have had much the longer exposure and
still adhere to their traditional caution.
The observable difference in attitudes must be laid to something
else. Perhaps that something else is to be found in the puritan
*Dr. Beardsley is professor of Law and Librarian of the Law School,
University of Washington.
2Hon. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, President of the American Bar Associa-
tion, in an address on University Legal Education and the American Bar,
American Bar Association Journal, vol. xxiv, No. 2, February, 1938, p. 105,
at p. 107.
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genius for moralizing; a genius not particularly characteristic of
maturity in experience, yet not unfamiliar nor without its peculiar
value when new institutions and new social conventions are in the
making. The simplicity of the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution of the United States are outstanding in world
history as examples of the thought and meaning which this kind
of intellectual purity can produce.
A less esoteric explanation, however, suggests itself as the conse-
quence of the state of society in this country during and for many
years following the colonial period, when pioneering conditions
prevailed and the methods of making and administering the law
were not only subordinate to the working out of political formulae
but also hampered by lack of precedent and the paucity of lawyers
trained in the ever present discipline of the English courts; a
discipline which apparently required more familiarity with the
course of judicial decision as the basis for resolving new as well
as old controversies, rather than appeals to "first" principles and
the power of the syllogism.
In other words, American lawyers and American judges did not
very generally, nor very early, have access to original sources, even
of their contemporary period, when American common law was
developing, and the style of argument and opinion taking shape.
Under such conditions it is not at all surprising that the American
legal mind became wedded to the notion of fixed and immutable
principle as the foundation of all order and so readily accepted
the syllogisms of Austin -as to the meaning and content of the
common law; the more so, perhaps, because the Austinian definition
of law as "sovereign command ' 2 jibed so well with the notion of
a republican form of government under the aegis of strict con-
stitutional declarations of power. The result was that, until lately,
for the great mass of American lawyers the rules of the common
law may have had the appearance of a "sort of natural law which,
though evolved from the past, are to be applied as fixed rules to
all cases arising in the future".8
Possibly it was a reaction from over-much principle that gave
so much emphasis to the case system of teaching law; for the study
of judicial action in relation to its factual setting reduces principle
to its proper proportions in the judicial process as marking out
the path from one exercise of the judicial function in adjusting in-
dividual controversies to another. By such study even the language
of the law is brought to the severe test of comparing words with
actions and the constant evaluation of principle in terms of result.
It is an interesting subject of speculation as to what now might
be the complexion of our legalism if more than possibly two genera-
tions of American lawyers had been universally and constantly in
contact not alone with texts and encyclopedias but with reported
cases dealing with almost the whole of the recorded common law.
The process of collecting, reporting and publishing judicial de-
cisions has kept pace in efficiency with demands made upon the
courts and the legal profession by the increase in the volume and
'AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE.
'LEWIS, HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1937), p. 214.
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complexity of legal business. Even the first trickles of judicial
thought are being resuscitated and added to the armory of com-
mon law lawyers. 4 Great collections of law books outside of private
libraries are easily available to practicing lawyers as well as
students and scholars. The day is long since past when a lawyer
actively engaged in important litigation waited with longing and
impatience for the publication of judicial records bearing directly
upon the crucial problem in his case, as did Horace Binney one
hundred years ago.- Hardly any lawyer nowadays can plead that,
for want of books, he is prevented from examining all the material
which can throw light upon the legal aspects of his clients' im-
mediate problems; and the important books, beyond doubt, are the
reports of judicial decisions.
Books are of no value, however, if the people who need them
do not know about them. The fairly late introduction into law
school curricula of courses on legal bibliography and the use of
books of the law has the very great value of starting the young
lawyer with some sense of the meaning of authority in the law
and the places where it can be found. The value of this knowledge
is not restricted to the period of -apprenticeship but follows the
vocation of the scholar, practitioner or judge, at once facilitating
and enlarging each one's understanding of the rational purposes
of law and increasing his command over its methods. Yet, without
some descriptive index to the accumulated legal material its content
is lost in a conglomerate of ink, paper and leather, the very mass
of which defies closer inspection.
Dr. Beardsley's recent book is an efficient tool with which lawyer
and judge, no less than the student, can pry open the source-
material of the common law, both in England -and in the American
jurisdictions; not merely of the past, but currently. Prepared
primarily for the use of students, the book is the product of a long
experience as librarian and a comprehensive knowledge of the ma-
terial. It is meticulously and lucidly organized; the nature of the
source books in the field of law, their relative importance, their
history, and their uses are ably described; the collateral material
of the digests, encyclopedias, commentaries, texts, annotations, and
the citation devices are exhaustively dealt with; and resistance to
the unfamiliar labels and official designations is completely broken
down by bibliographies of state and territorial reports embodying
the American decisions, and of the English, Irish, Scotch and
Colonial reports.
Familiarity with the mere existence of this abundant legal ma-
terial ought to encourage any lawyer to allow his search for reason
'Such, for example, as the publications of the Selden Society in Eng-
land, and The Ames Foundation.
6in the case of Vidal v. Girard's Ex., 2 How. (U. S.) 127 (1844). See
reference of Justice Story to then recent publication of the records of
Chancery cases prior to the Stat. ,43 Eliz. and compare with Binney's
argument. Justice Story said: "They (the records) establish in the most
satisfactory and conclusive manner that cases of charities where there
were trustees appointed for general and indefinite charities, as well as
for specific charities, were familiarly known to, and acted upon, and en-
forced in the Court of Chancery". This was the crux of the case.
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and authority to take a wide range. Dictation rather than elucida-
tion is too often the tone of legal discussions. Persuasion, of course,
requires an appeal to principles in the sense that they are believed
to be sound and authoritative by general acceptance. Yet, even in
the field of forensic discussion of law, familiarity with the materials
available for the guidance of the courts can hardly fail to improve
the skill of the practicing lawyer and raise the quality of judicial
decisions. A strong conviction of the practical value to the lawyer
of a knowledge of the materials of his profession may be enough
justification for the suggestion that, if any lawyer is going to
practice with only one book in his library, this book should be it.
At least that lawyer will know where the law is recorded which is
one step in finding out what some of it is.
